

# Request from Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Criticality Safety Design

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


**MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.**

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# Nuclear Fuel Cycle (LWR)



# Variety of Fissile Materials (1)

## Uranium “Cradle to Grave” and Rebirth

- ◆ Ore – Uranium Compounds (ADU,  $UF_6$ , Oxide)
- ◆ Gas – Suspension – Precipitation – Powder – Pellets – Rods – Assemblies
- ◆ Spent Fuel (U, Pu, FPs, MAs) Assemblies
- ◆ Assemblies – Chopped Oxide (U/Pu/FP/MA)
  - Nitric Solution (U/Pu/FP/MA) – Nitric Solution (U/Pu)
- ◆ Powder ( $RUO_3$ , MOX) – Pellets (MOX) – MOX Assemblies

# Variety of Fissile Materials (2)

## Gaseous

- ◆ Hexa-Fluoride :  $UF_6$

## Fluidal

- ◆ Fluoride Solution :  $UO_2F_2$ aq
- ◆ Nitric Solution :  $UO_2(NO_3)_2$ aq,  $Pu(NO_3)_4$ aq
- ◆ Homo. Powder :  $UO_2/ UO_3-H_2O$ ,  $MOX-H_2O$
- ◆ Slurry : ADU

## Solid & Mixture

- ◆ Hetero. Pellets/Rods/FAs :  $UO_2-H_2O$ ,  $MOX-H_2O$
- ◆ Dissolving Hetero. Mixture : Spent  $UO_2$  – Nitric Solution

# Variety of Fissile Materials (3)

- ◆ Indeterminate Form
  - : Heterogeneity, Non-uniformity, Randomness
  - => Modeling Capability of Criticality Codes
- ◆ Dry, Wet, Aqueous Solution
  - : Various Moderation Condition (H/HM)
  - => Variety of **Neutron Spectra**
- ◆ LEU, Plutonium, MA, Their Mixture
  - : Various Resonance Nuclides
  - => Accurate **Resonance Data & Treatment**

# Criticality Design Practices in Japanese Industries(1)

- ◆ Standardized Criticality Calculation Codes Systems with Group Constants & Monte Carlo Code (ex.KENO family)
- ◆ JACS (JAPAN)  
MGCL (Multi-Group Constants Library) :  
ENDF/B-IV based 137G / 26G  
=> Applied to Many Licensing Cases
- ◆ SCALE (USA)  
CSRL (Criticality Safety Reference Library) :  
ENDF/B-V based 238G / 44G  
ENDF/B-IV based 218G / 27G etc

# Criticality Design Practices in Japanese Industries(2)

- ◆ Reactor Core Design Codes (ex. PHOENIX-P/HIDRA)  
F/A Storage at Power Plant Site  
ENDF-B/V based 42G (PWR Fuels Storage)  
Consistency with Reactor Core Design
- ◆ Continuous Energy Monte Carlo Codes  
Used for Many Studies without Licensing Purpose  
MCNP(USA) – ENDF-B/VI , JENDL-3.3 etc  
MVP(Japan) – ENDF-B/VI, JENDL-3.3 etc



# Criticality Safety Design Criteria(1)

- ◆ The Most Common : 0.95 Criterion

$$k\text{-eff} \leq 0.95$$

where  $k\text{-eff}$  is calculated with the “**well qualified**” criticality code system.

- ◆ The Estimated Critical Lower Limit  $k\text{-eff}$  (usu.  $\geq 0.95$ )  
Nuclear Data – Criticality Code – Fissile Systems Specific  
Reliability Limit Derived from Criticality Benchmarks  
Bare Computational Uncertainty w/o Engineered Margin

# Criticality Safety Design Criteria(2)

- ◆ JACS with ENDF-B/IV based 137G-MGCL

Fissile System	critical $k_{eff}$	lower limit $k_{eff}$
Homo. LEU	0.989	0.958
<b>Hetero. LEU</b>	0.996	<b>0.978</b>
Pu Solution	1.004	0.973
Homo. MOX	1.018	0.980
<b>Hetero. MOX</b>	0.998	<b>0.980</b>
U/Pu Mixed Solution	0.991	0.950

Ref. "Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook Version2", JAERI-1340 (1999)

# Logistics in Nuclear Fuel Cycle – Fuel Casks



- ◆ Casks
  - Versatile Logistic Components for Nuclear Fuel Cycle.
  - Transportation, Interim/Long-Term Storage
- ◆ Global Market

# Performance of Casks

- ◆ Payloads – No. of Fuel Assemblies/ cask
- ◆ Affordable Material – Neutron Absorber  
Gamma/Neutron Shielding
- ◆ Mechanical Strength, Heat Resistance and  
Radiation Resistance
- ◆ Easy to Handle – Light Weight
- ◆ Total Cost Performance

# Criticality Safety of Current Spent Fuel Casks

- ◆ Subcritical when immersed in water
- ◆ Subcritical when piled up in numbers
- ◆ Neutron Absorber : B-SUS, B-Al, B-Resin,  
Cd-Alloy etc
- ◆ **Unirradiated** Fuel with Initial  $^{235}\text{U}$  enrich.
- ◆  $k_{eff} \leq 0.95$  (usu.)

# Challenge for Burnup Credit (BUC)

- ◆ “A Guide Introducing BU Credit, Preliminary Version”, JAERI-Tech 2001-055
- ◆ Two Levels of Conservatism,  
Level 1 : Actinides Only (U, Pu, (+MA))  
Level 2 : Actinides and Fission Products
- ◆ Uncertainty of **Isotopic Composition** of SF :  
Nuclear Data, Depletion Code, Depletion Conditions  
as well as Cooling Time after Reactor Shutdown
- ◆ Uncertainty of **Criticality Prediction** of SF Systems :  
Nuclear Data, Criticality Code  
as well as Isotopic Composition

# Validation Requirement for BUC

- ◆ **Isotopic Composition**
  - Post-Irradiation Examination (PIE) Data
  - PIE Data Base : SFCOMPO (JAERI)
- ◆ **Criticality with Spent Fuel**
  - Criticality Tests with Actual SF
    - ex. REBUS International Program (Bergonuclaire)
  - Power Reactor Simulation with Criticality Codes
- ◆ Integral Tests are with Difficulty by Nature
  - To Cover Whole Spectrum of Depletion Environment,
  - To Fund High Cost to Handle Irradiated Fuels.

# Level-1 : Actinide BU Credit

- ◆ Already Applied to Many Examples
- ◆ Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (Japan)  
SF Storage Pool (Residual  $^{235}\text{U}$  Enrich. Control)  
Dissolver and Head End  
U+Pu Only
- ◆ Dry Storage (Germany)
- ◆ Transport Casks (France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and USA)



# Level-2: FP Credit (1)

- ◆ Already Applied to Several Examples
- ◆ NPP Site Spent Fuel Pit (USA)
- ◆ Long-lived and Chemically Stable (Non-Gaseous nor Non-Volatile) Nuclides are Preferred

## Level-2: FP Credit (2)

- ◆ Selected Important Nuclides :

**6FPs** (CEA-France at early stage)

Sm-149, Rh-103, Gd-155, Nd-143, Cs-133, Sm-152

**12FPs** (JAERI-Tech 2001-055)

+ Tc-99, Eu-153, Nd-145, Sm-147, Mo-95, Sm-150


**15FPs** (OECD BUC W.G.)

+ Sm-151, Ag-109, Ru-101

**13FPs** (SAND87-0151) for Casks

Tc-99, Rh-103, *Xe-131*, Cs-133, Nd-143, Nd-145, Pm-147,  
Sm-147, Sm-149, Sm-151, Sm-152, Eu-153, Gd-155

# Level-2: FP Credit (3)




Ref. JAERI-Tech 2001-055

## Level-2: FP Credit (4)


- ◆ Case Study : PWR Spent Fuel Cask
- ◆ Boronated Aluminum(B-Al) Spacer + Flux Trap Design
- ◆ Reference Fuel : PWR 4.1wt% Intact => 4.8wt% BUC
- ◆ Flux Trap / B-10 Content Surveyed with No BUC, Level-1,  
Level-2A : 13 FP Nuclides(SAND87-0151) or  
Level-2B : All FP Nuclides Considered BUC.
- ◆ Assumed Uncertainty in Isotopic Composition  
U, Pu, Actinides : +5% for fissile, -5% for fertile  
FPs : -20 %

## Level-2: FP Credit (5)




### Cask Model for Case Study

# Level-2: FP Credit (6)



# Level-2: FP Credit (7)



# Recent Issue : SF Disposal

- ◆ What if Reprocessing Project is Given Up?
- ◆ Economic Study Associated with Periodic Revision of “Long Term Plan” by Japan Atomic Energy Commission.
- ◆ Major Technical and Non-Technical Challenges were Studied and Assessed.
- ◆ Criticality Issue was Identified As One of the Major Uncertainties of the Study, since **No Safety Evaluation Criteria for Pu etc's Criticality Prevention** had not yet been established.



# Uncertainty of Disposed SF Criticality

- ◆ No Safety Evaluation Criteria.
- ◆ Modeling, Scenario and Phenomenology are not Well Established.

From the Viewpoint of Nuclear Data :

- ◆ Very Long Term ( $\sim 10^3$ y) Transient of Isotopics.
- ◆ Integral Validation Difficulty

# Conclusions (1)

- ◆ Nuclear fuel cycle consists of wide spectrum of fissile systems. Variety of resonance nuclides and neutron spectra are to be covered.
- ◆ Better qualified codes and nuclear data could improve criticality safety design criteria, and give more competitive edge to nuclear fuel cycle.

## Conclusions (2)

- ◆ Burnup credit is the major front of criticality safety design of spent fuel(SF) systems.
- ◆ Level-2 burnup or FP credit is promising, whose efficiency depends on uncertainty of SF characteristics and their prediction.

## Conclusions (3)

- ◆ Integral tests for SF systems are difficult by nature, microscopic validation would be of more importance.
- ◆ In SF disposal study, criticality issue was identified as one of the major uncertainties. If its reduction was necessitated, improvement of FP and actinides data would play a certain role.